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Education and income inequality in the regions of the European Union 
Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical study of the determinants of income inequality across regions of 
the EU. Using the European Community Household Panel dataset for 102 regions over the period 
1995-2000, it analyses how microeconomic changes in human capital distribution affect income 
inequality. Human capital distribution is measured in terms of both educational attainment as well 
as educational inequality. Income and educational inequalities are calculated by a generalised 
entropy index (Theil index). Different static and dynamic panel data analyses are conducted in 
order to reduce measurement error on inequalities and minimise potential problems of omitted-
variable bias. Taking into account the specification tests applied to the estimated models, the 
regression results reveal that, while the relationship between income inequality and income per 
capita is positive, the long-run relationship between income inequality and educational attainment 
is not statistically significant. This paper also agrees with the current belief that human capital 
inequality  has  a  positive  relationship  with  income  inequality.  Across  European  regions  high 
levels of inequality in educational attainment are associated with higher income inequality. This 
may be interpreted as the responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications 
and skills. Other results indicate that the average age of respondents and inactivity are sensitive to 
the specification model, while economic activity and urbanisation are negatively associated to 
income inequality. Furthermore, the relationship between unemployment and income inequality is 
positive. Female participation in the labour force is negatively associated with inequality and 
explains a major part of the variation in inequality. Finally, as expected, income inequality is 
lower  in  democratic  welfare  states,  in  Protestant  areas,  and  in  regions  with  Nordic  family 
structures (i.e. Swedish and Danish regions).  
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1. Introduction 
It is often claimed that greater educational attainment makes societies more egalitarian, 
and income and educational inequalities are perfectly correlated (Checchi, 2000). But, in 
spite of these claims, the influence of education on inequalities is still a long way from 
being  perfectly  understood,  especially  at  a  regional  level.  This  paper  addresses  the 
questions  of  the  supposed  negative  relationship  between  educational  attainment  and 
income inequality and of the positive correlation between inequality in education and in 
income for the regions of the EU. Our methodology is based on the estimation of various 
specification models (both static and dynamic) in order to assess the sensitivity of the 
relationships. 
This  aim  of  the  paper  is  to  analyse  how  microeconomic  changes  in  human  capital 
distribution  affect  income  inequality.  Human  capital  is  generally  a  multidimensional 
concept  and  has  been  defined  by  the  OECD  (1998,  p.9)  as  ‘the  knowledge,  skills, 
competences and other attributes embodied in individuals that are relevant to economic 
activity’. In this paper human capital distribution is measured both in terms of the average 
education of the population and the inequality in educational attainment. By analysing the 
microeconomic processes underpinning the relationship between individual educational 
endowments and income inequality, we also expect to draw greater light on whether  
government  education  policies  contribute  to  a  more  equal  income  distribution  and 
whether EU labour market is responsive to differences in qualifications, knowledge and 
skills. 
The paper is organised in five additional sections.  The next section reviews the existing 
debate  over  the  determinants  of  income  inequality,  putting  greater  emphasis  on  the 
relationship between income and human capital distribution. The empirical regression 
model and the relevant static and dynamic estimation methods are discussed in Section 3. 
Section  4  describes  the data  and the construction of variables.  Section  5  reports  and 
discusses  the  regression  results  and  finally  Section  6  concludes  with  policy 
recommendations and some suggestions for further research.   
   4 
2. Theoretical considerations 
There is a vast literature on the determinants of income inequality. It is therefore not the 
aim of this section to review this vast array of sources, but simply to focus on how the 
impact of income per capita, as well as of average and inequality levels of education on 
income inequality is perceived by the literature. In order to do that, we will first review 
the  link  between  income  and  inequality,  followed  by  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of 
educational attainment and inequality on income inequality. We will also consider the 
dynamic structure of inequalities. 
Changes in the distribution of income take place at a very slow pace. There are several 
reasons for this. First, people are often reluctant to change jobs for psychological and 
institutional reasons (Gujarati, 1995). Additionally, income levels are often perpetuated 
from one generation to another by means of inheritance, cultural background and, more 
generally, characteristics of the community (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; Cooper 
et al., 1994; Durlauf, 1996; Checchi, 2000). This allows for intergenerational stability in 
income,  denoting  the  existence  of  a  positive  autocorrelation  in  inequalities.  Cooper 
(1998), for instance, has pointed out that families from poor communities or wealthy 
communities tend to exhibit higher intergenerational income stability than families living 
in  middle  income  communities.  Hence,  it  is  often  the  case  that  a  proportion  of  the 
population  remains  trapped  at  low  and  high  levels  of  income  for  more  than  one 
generation.  Income  persistence  is  often  viewed  (e.g.  Lane,  1971)  as  an  essential 
characteristic  of  rewarding  achievement  and,  particularly,  of  ensuring  that  the  most 
suitable persons are allocated the most suitable roles. The presence of inequalities in 
income provides an additional incentive to achievement and innovation which are an 
integral part of modern society. Some degree of inequality is generally perceived as a 
necessary constituent of a healthily functioning economy (Champernowne and Cowell, 
1998,  p.14).  The  question  is  whether  the  persistence  of  inequality  has  an  impact  on 
economic performance. Do unequal societies perform better than more equal ones?  
This  relationship  has  been  most  famously  addressed  by  Kuznets  (1955)  in  his  now 
famous Kuznets’ curve (Kuznets, 1955), which was later formalised by Robinson (1976), 
Knight  (1976)  and  Fields  (1979).  Income  levels  have  an  inverted  U-curve  effect  on   5 
income inequality. Income inequality increases as nations begin to industrialise and then 
declines at the later stages of industrialisation. Two fundamental factors which shape the 
inverted  U-curve  are  the  level  of  industrialisation  (or  the  degree  of  integration)  and 
labour  migration.  More  specifically,  in  the  early  stages  of  development,  the  highest 
portion  of  the  labour  force  is  engaged  in  agriculture.  As  industrialisation,  or  more 
generally speaking, as economic, social and political integration proceeds, workers move 
from the larger agricultural sector to the smaller industrial one where wages are usually 
higher. This migration boosts initially even more income inequality. This in turn implies 
that income distribution becomes more unequal as income increases. However, according 
to neoclassical economic theory, as the agricultural sector shrinks and industry grows, 
further  movement  from  the  agricultural  to  the  industrial  sector  increases  agricultural 
wages reducing income inequality. Therefore, development is inegalitarian in the early 
stages of development and becomes egalitarian at the later stages.  
Despite the significant amount of the research that has tried to test whether the Kuznets 
curve  works  at  the  national  level,  the  results  are  ambiguous  (e.g.  Ahluwalia,  1976; 
Papanek and Kyn, 1986; Anand and Kanbur, 1993; Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1998; 
Checchi,  2000;  Motonishi,  2003).  Ahluwalia  (1976),  for  instance,  finds  for  a  cross-
section of counties evidence to support the inverted U-curve, while Anand and Kanbur 
(1993),  in  contrast,  report  that  the  Kuznets  curve  is  not  inverse  at  all.  Overall  the 
literature  seems  unable  to  provide  conclusive  empirical  results  on  the  relationship 
between  income  inequality  and  income  per  capita,  because  social  structures,  such  as 
historical heritage, religion, ethnic composition and cultural traditions, across countries 
evolve differently (Checchi, 2000). In this paper, we do not expect to test the validity of 
the Kuznets curve, because firstly, the majority of the relevant empirical studies are based 
not only on European but also on less economically advanced countries (i.e. African 
countries) and secondly, because these studies show that the declining segment of the 
Kuznets curve begins approximately from 1970 (Nielsen and Alderson, 1997). But we 
use Kuznets’ theory in order to assume a linear association between income per capita 
and income inequality for developed countries over a relatively limited period of time. 
We thus expect that over the period 1995-2000 income per capita has a negative effect on 
income inequality.    6 
The notion of education as a factor behind income differences also has a long history, 
going back to Adam Smith (Griliches, 1997). Stemming from the work of Schultz (1961, 
1962), Becker (1962, 1964) and Mincer (1958a,b, 1974), income inequality is generally 
considered to be affected by educational attainment, which is sometimes called ‘skills 
deepening’  (Williamson  1991).  Higher  educational  attainment  is  achieved  through 
improvements in access to education (i.e. lower tuition fees, better education financing, 
improved vocational training), higher quality of education (i.e. better services of teachers, 
librarians and administrators) and greater investment in physical capital for education. 
Improving access to education, for example, is likely to raise the earning opportunity of 
the lowest strata, leading to lower earning inequality (Checchi, 2000). Furthermore, a 
widespread access to education allows for a more informed participation in the market 
economy, reduces the lobbying ability of the rich, while simultaneously increases the 
social and job opportunities of the poor, implying lower inequality. The recent studies of 
DeGregorio and Lee (1999), Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2001) and Heshmati (2004) 
illustrate that higher educational attainment contributes to make income distribution more 
equal.  
According to Knight and Sabot (1983), the impact of educational attainment in income 
inequalities  depends  on  the  balance  between  the  ‘composition’  and  the  ‘wage 
compression’  effect.  Their  suggestions  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  greater 
inequality  of  educational  attainment  is  translated  into  greater  income  inequality. 
Concerning  the  ‘composition’  effect,  an  increase  in  the  levels  of  education  of  the 
population  tends, at least initially, to  increase income  inequality.  With respect to the 
‘wage compression’ effect, education tends to decrease income inequality. Additionally, 
an  increase  in  the  educated  labour  supply  should  increase  competition  for  positions 
requiring  advanced  educational  credentials  and  thereby  should  reduce  the  income 
differential between the educated and uneducated people (Tinbergen, 1975; Lecaillon et 
al., 1984).  
A different perspective on the relationship between income and education is given by 
Spence’s (1973, 1974) signalling model. This model depicts that education has no direct 
effect  on  income  distribution,  because  education  acts  as  a  ‘label’  or  ‘signal’.  More   7 
specifically, his model posits a situation in which the possibility of higher pay of more 
educated people has nothing to do with academic and vocational skills, because formal 
education is seen as an elaborate device for detecting and labelling those who have skills 
(Chambernowne and Cowell, 1998; Wolf, 2004). The education level is more related 
with innate ability and with psychological and personality traits, such as diligence, and 
these are what employers reward, rather than regarding education as a means of instilling 
or enhancing skills (Wolf, 2004). Nevertheless, education still works as a marker for 
achieving  better  jobs.  To  sum  up,  given  the  complexity  of  the  relationship  between 
education and income, it is difficult to predict a priori the sign and the significance of the 
relationship between educational attainment and income inequality. 
Finally most theoretical analyses tend to report that income and human capital inequality 
are positively correlated (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; 
Jacobs,  1985;  Gallor  and  Tsiddon,  1997a;  Chakravorty,  2003).  More  explicitly, 
Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002, p.1488) have pointed out that, with regard to the 
supply side of skilled labour education, a greater share of highly educated workers within 
a cohort may signal to the employers that those with less education have lower ability, 
and hence the  latter’s earnings may be reduced  accordingly,  which  may  also  lead  to 
larger wage inequality between high and low education workers. With respect to the 
demand side of skilled labour education, if the demand for unskilled labour is either 
contracting or growing at a slower rate than the demand for skilled labour, then earning 
inequalities will increase.  
Two  of  the  most  salient  empirical  works  that  focus  on  the  impact  of  human  capital 
distribution in terms of average and inequality levels on income inequality are Becker 
and  Chiswick  (1966)  and  Park  (1996).  Both  studies  illustrate  that  a  higher  level  of 
educational attainment of the labour force has an equalizing effect on income distribution 
and the larger the inequality of educational attainment, the greater the income inequality. 
 
3. Econometric approach   8 
As a means  to  test  whether the above-reported  findings hold  in a European  regional 
context, using microeconomic data, this paper estimates income inequality as a function 
of per capita income, educational attainment and educational inequality. We use different 
empirical specifications in order to assess the robustness of the econometric models and 
to examine the impact of adding control variables, such as age, unemployment, economic 
activity  rate,  labour  force  stock  and  urbanisation.  The  methodology  incorporates 
variability  both  across  regions  and  over  time.  It  constitutes  a  pooled  cross-sections 
analysis. Our emphasis is on the case where  ¥ ® N  with T  fixed and on the one-way 
error component model, due to the limited number of observations. Different static and 
dynamic panel  data analyses are conducted  in order to reduce measurement error on 
inequalities and minimise potential problems of omitted-variable bias. Panel data also 
allow for greater degrees of freedom than with time-series or cross-regional data and 
improve the accuracy of parameter estimates (Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). Thus in order 
to examine the impact of education on income inequality and to evaluate the robustness 
of the results, we not only experiment with a number of alternative static and dynamic 
specifications, but also include additional determinants to our equations. 
3.1 Static econometric models 
Our econometric analysis starts with a static panel data model of the form 
it i i it it z x y e n g b + + + = ' '                 (1) 
with i denoting regions ( N i ,..., 1 = ) and t time ( 6 ,..., 1 = t )
1.  it y  is income inequality,  it x  
is  a  vector  of  explanatory  variables  (income  per  capita,  educational  attainment, 
educational  inequality,  age,  labour  force  stock,  total  economic  activity  rate, 
unemployment, inactivity and female economic activity rate),  i z  is the urbanisation ratio 
of  a  region,  b   and  g   are  coefficients,  i n   is  an  unobserved  regional-specific  effect 
(unobserved  heterogeneity)  and  it e   is  the  disturbance  term  with  0 ] [ = it E e   and 
2 ] [ e s e = it Var  (idiosyncratic error). The term  it i v e +  is the composite error. 
                                                 
1  1 = t  denotes 1995, …,  6 = t  denotes 2000    9 
We  then  consider  the  role  of  welfare  state,  religion  and  family  structure  on  income 
inequality. These are explanatory variables, represented by dummies in the static panel 
data model. Our analysis takes on the following form: 
it i i it it d x y e n h b l + + + = ' ' ,                (2) 
where  h   are  coefficients  and  i dl   is  a  vector  of  dummy  variables  with  l denoting 
categories  ( m ,..., 2 = l ).  If  a  qualitative  variable  has  m categories,  we  introduce 
1 - m dummy  variables  (categories).  Category  i d1 is  referred  to  as  the  base  category. 
Comparisons are made with that category (Gujarati, 1995). 
This  static model  is  characterised  by  one  source  of  persistence  over  time  due  to  the 
presence of unobserved regional-specific effects. The presented static methods of panel 
estimation  are  pooled  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS),  fixed  effects  (FEs)  and  random 
effects (REs). To evaluate which technique is optimal, it is necessary to consider the 
relationship between the regional-specific effects and the regressors, among others. First, 
the  pooled  OLS  estimator  assumes  that  the  unobserved  regional-specific  effect  is 
uncorrelated  with  the  explanatory  variables  and  each  region  is  independent  and 
identically distributed, ignoring the panel structure of the data and the information it 
provides (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). The resulting bias in pooled OLS is caused from 
omitting  a  time-constant  variable  and  is  sometimes  called  heterogeneity  bias 
(Wooldridge, 2003, p.439). Second, the FEs estimator (or within estimator) assumes that 
some or all of the regressors are correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity. Besides, 
the main reason for collecting panel data is to allow for the unobserved heterogeneity to 
be correlated with the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2003, p.440). FEs estimator is 
obtained by removing the unobserved regional characteristics which is a potential source 
of  bias.  More  specifically,  it  is  a  pooled  OLS  estimator  that  is  based  on  the  time-
demeaned variables. FEs estimator also requires that there be within-group variation in 
variables for at least some groups. We therefore introduce a year dummy variable with 
the urbanisation degree (time constant variable) in order to see whether the effect of 
urbanisation has changed over 1995-2000. Third, the REs estimator assumes that the 
regional-specific effects are uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables in all time   10 
periods. The provided efficient estimator of the REs model in this study is the generalised 
least squares (GLS) estimator. Both the FEs and the REs models deal with heterogeneity 
bias. The former treats the  i v  as fixed effects to be estimated, while the latter treats the 
i v  as a random component of the error term. 
Both FEs and REs estimators are based on the strict exogeneity assumption. Hence the 
vector  of  the  explanatory  variables  ( it x   and  i z )  is  strictly  exogenous.  It  should  be 
mentioned that the parameters from the static models are long-run parameters. The usual 
diagnostic tests are presented. Hausman’s (1978) chi-squared statistic tests whether the 
GLS  estimator  is  an  appropriate  alternative  to  the  FEs  estimator.  Another  critical 
diagnostic test is Breusch and Pagan’s (1980) Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic which is 
a test of the REs model against OLS model. LM test is a test for regional effects. Large 
values of LM statistic favour the REs model.  
In the static models, we assume that the regression disturbances are homoskedastic with 
the  same  variance  across  time  and  regions.  However,  heteroskendasticity  potentially 
causes  problems  for  inferences  based  on  least  squares.  Assuming  homoskedastic 
disturbances in the FEs model, for example, might be a restrictive assumption for panels 
(Baltagi, 2005). Thus when heteroskedasticity is present, the consistent estimates are not 
efficient. If every  it e  has a different variance, the robust estimation of the FEs OLS 
covariance  matrix  is  presented  following  the  White  estimator  for  unspecified 
heteroskedasticity  (White,  1980).  We  also  report  the  robust  standard  errors  of  each 
equation. 
3.2 Dynamic econometric models 
There are a variety of different techniques that can be used to estimate a dynamic model 
of the form: 
it i i t i it t i it z x x y y e n g z b d + + + + + = - - ' ' ' 1 , 1 ,             (3)   11 
with  i denoting regions ( N i ,..., 1 = ) and  t time ( 6 ,..., 2 = t )
2.  it y  is income inequality, 
1 , - t i y  is the first lagged income inequality,  it x  is a vector of explanatory variables,  1 , - t i x  is 
a vector of first lagged explanatory variables,  i z  is the urbanisation ratio of a region, d , 
b ,  z  and  g  are coefficients,  i n  are the random effects (unobserved regional-specific 
effects) that are independent and identically distributed over the panels and  it e  is the 
disturbance term with  0 ] [ = it E e  and 
2 ] [ e s e = it Var  (idiosyncratic error). It is assumed 
that the  i n  and the  it e  are independent for each i over all t. 
This  dynamic  model  is  characterised  by  two  sources  of  persistence  over  time: 
autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors 
and  unobserved  regional-specific  effects  (Baltagi,  2005).  Pooled  OLS,  FEs  and  REs 
estimators are now biased and inconsistent, because econometric model contains a lagged 
endogenous variable (Baltagi, 2005). 
The dynamic panel structure of our data is exploited by a generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimation suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) (Arellano-Bond estimation). 
The main idea behind GMM estimation is to establish population moment conditions and 
then use sample analogs of these moment conditions to compute parameter estimates 
(Greene, 2000; Wooldridge 2002; Baltagi, 2005). Arellano and Bond first transform the 
model to eliminate the regional-specific effect ( i n ). The observed urbanisation ratio ( i z ) 
is eliminated as well. The first-differencing transformation is: 
) ( ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( 1 , 2 , 1 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 1 , - - - - - - - - + - + - + - = - t i it t i t i t i it t i t i t i it x x x x y y y y e e z b d ,  (4) 
where  all  variables  are  expressed  as  deviations  from  period  means.  Models  in  first 
differences usually face the problems arising from the non-stationarity of the data. The 
correlation  between  the  explanatory  variables  and  the  error  is  handled  by  instrument 
variables  (IVs).  In  Arellano-Bond  estimations,  the  predetermined  and  endogenous 
variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels, while 
the strictly exogenous regressors can enter the instrument matrix in first differences. For 
                                                 
2  2 = t  denotes 1996, …,  6 = t  denotes 2000.   12 
instance, for 1997 ) 3 ( = t ,  1 , i y  is an instrument for  ) ( 1 , 2 , i i y y -  and not correlated with 
) ( 2 3 i i e e -  as long as the  it e  themselves are not serially correlated; for 1998  ) 4 ( = t ,  1 , i y  
and  2 , i y  are instruments for  ) ( 2 , 3 , i i y y - , and so on. This procedure is more efficient than 
the Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) two stage least squares estimator which does not 
make use of all of the available moment conditions (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995). Anderson 
and  Hsiao  use  ) ( 3 , 2 , - - - t i t i y y   or  2 , - t i y   only  as  an  instrument  for  2 , 1 , - - - t i t i y y .  The 
Arellano-Bond  structure  provides  a  large  number  of  IVs  by  GMM  estimator.  The 
Arellano-Bond framework, which is called ‘difference GMM’ (GMM-DIF), treats the 
dynamic model as a system of equations, one for each time period. 
In our model, we assume that the explanatory variables might be: 
a.  strictly exogenous, if  0 ] [ = is it x E e  for all t and s, 
b.  predetermined, if  0 ] [ ¹ is it x E e  for  t s < , but  0 ] [ = is it x E e  for all  t s ³ , and 
c.  endogenous, if  0 ] [ ¹ is it x E e  for  t s £ , but  0 ] [ = is it x E e  for all  t s > ; 
except  for  the  average  age  of  respondents  which  is  definitely  a  strictly  exogenous 
variable. 
The GMM methodology is based on a set of diagnostics. First of all, it assumes that there 
is  no  second-order  autocorrelation  in  the  first-differenced  idiosyncratic  errors
3. 
Additionally, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed Sargan’s test (Sargan, 1958) of over-
identifying restrictions. The Sargan test has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution in the 
case of homoskedastic error term only. Both the homoskedastic one-step and the robust 
one-step  GMM  estimators  are  presented.  The  two-step  standard  error  model  is  not 
recommended, because it tends to be biased downward in small samples (Arellano and 
Bond,  1991;  Blundell  and  Bond,  1998).  It  also  should  be  mentioned  that  treating 
variables as predetermined or endogenous increases the size of the instrument matrix very 
                                                 
3 The consistency of the GMM estimator relies upon the fact that  0 ] [ 2 , = D D - t i it E e e  (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991, p.282).   13 
quickly. This implies that GMM estimators with too many overidentifying restrictions 
may perform poorly in small samples (Kiviet, 1995)
4. 
The dynamic model is also used in order to obtain short-run and long-run parameters. 
The short-run effect of an independent variable is the first year effect of a change in this 
variable, whereas the long-run effect is the effect obtained after full adjustment of income 
inequality.  The  short-run  effect  of  the  variable  x  is  b   and  its  long-run  effect  is 
d g b - + 1 . Long-run standard errors are calculating using the Delta method (Greene, 
2000).   
Broadly speaking, the advantage of dynamic over static models is that the former correct 
the inconsistentcy introduced by lagged endogenous variables and, also, permits a certain 
degree of endogeneity in the regressors. 
 
4. Data and variables 
The quantitative data used to estimate the econometric models come from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) data survey conducted by the EU during the period 
1994-2001  (wave2-wave8)  and  the  Eurostat’s  Regio  data  set.  During  that  period  the 
surveys were conducted regularly at approximately one-year intervals. In these surveys 
individuals were interviewed about their socioeconomic status. Data stemming from the 
ECHP can be aggregated regionally at NUTS1 level for the EU15. Unfortunately there 
are no data available for the Netherlands. Finnish regions had to be dropped from the 
sample because of the discrepancies between the regional division included in the ECHP 
and  those  in  the  Regio  databank,  the  source  of  the  macroeconomic  variables.  The 
resulting database includes 102 NUTS I or II regions from 13 countries in the EU
5. On 
average 116.574 individuals were surveyed, with a maximum of 124,759 in 1997 and a 
minimum of 105,079 in 2001. 
                                                 
4 cited in STATA manual (release 8): cross-sectional time-series, p.24. 
5 NUTS I data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden. 
NUTS II data for Germany, Portugal, and the UK.   14 
The variable ‘Total net personal income (detailed, NC, total year prior to the survey)’  
from the ECHP is used as the main source for the average income and the level of income 
inequalities. This variable is regionalised. Income per capita  ) (IMN  is transformed for 
the same level of prices using the harmonised indices for consumer prices and then is 
divided by 1000. Income inequality  ) 1 (IGE  is calculated using the generalised Theil 
entropy index (Theil, 1967). This index considers a region’s population of individuals 
{ } N i ,..., 2 , 1 Î   where  each  person  is  associated  with  a  unique  value  of  the  measured 
income. The total net personal income is the sum of wages and salaries, income from self 
employment or farming, pensions, unemployment and redundancy benefits or any other 
social  benefits  or  grants,  and  private  income.  Income  inequality  is  defined  as 
￿
=
=
N
i
i i Ny y IGE
1
) log( 1 , where  i y  is income share that is individual i’s total income as a 
proportion of total income for the entire regional population. This index varies from 0 for 
perfect equality to  N log  for perfect inequality. 
The  average  and  the  inequality  level  of  human  capital  are  calculated  using  the 
microeconomic variable ‘Highest level of general or higher education completed’ which 
also is extracted from the ECHP data set. Individuals are classified into three educational 
categories:  recognised  third  level  education  completed,  second  stage  of  secondary 
education  level  completed,  and  less  than  second  stage  of  secondary  education  level 
completed.  These  categories,  which  are  mutually  exclusive,  allow  for  international 
comparisons, because they are defined by the International Standard Classification of 
Education. 
The average level of human capital (or average education level completed) was first has 
been defined by Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) and Ram (1990). It corresponds to 
the educational attainment (or educational achievement) level and is given by the index 
￿
=
=
3
1 j
j jS L EMN , where  j L  is the proportion of the respondents who belong in the 
th j  
category  and  j S   denotes  an  assessment  of  each  category.  At  the  risk  of  some 
oversimplification, we assume  2 1 = S  for recognised third level education completed,   15 
1 2 = S  for second stage of secondary education level completed, and  0 3 = S  for less than 
second stage of secondary education level completed. This assessment is based upon two 
critical assumptions. The first one is that an increase in the level of education will add a 
constant  quantity  to  educational  attainment,  whether  undertaken  by  a  primary  or 
secondary student, and the second one is that acquisition of postgraduate degrees will not 
add  any  quality  to  educational  attainment,  because  both  graduate  and  postgraduate 
degrees belong to the same educational category.  
Following the work of Fan et al. (2000), we calculate the inequalities in educational 
attainment  using  an  education  Theil  index  ) 1 (EGE .  This  is  defined  as 
￿
=
=
N
i
i i Nz z EGE
1
) log( 1 , where  i z  is human capital share, that is, individual  i’s higher 
education level completed as a proportion of total human capital for the entire regional 
population. As in the case for income inequality the index has a minimum value of  0  
when  the  entire  population  is  concentrated  in  a  single  educational  category,  and  a 
maximum of  N log .  
As a way of controlling for the impact of additional factors, we also examine the impact 
of additional quantitative time-variant variables on income inequality: the average age of 
people  ) (AGE ,  the  percentage  of  normally  working  (15+  hours/week)  respondents 
) (LFSTOCK , the percentage of unemployed respondents  ) (UNEM  and the percentage 
of inactive respondents  ) (INACTIVE  within a region. The source of these variables is 
again  the  ECHP  data  set.  Other  controls  include  the  economic  activity  rate  of  the 
population  ) (ECACRA and female activity rate  ) (ECACRF  from the Eurostat’s Regio 
data  set.  These  are  also  time-variant  variables.  The  urbanization  ratio  of  a  region 
) (URBANDPA  is constructed as the percentage of respondents who live in a densely 
populated area. Data for this variable are only available for 2000 and 2001, and not for all 
countries. We assume that the urbanization ratio from 1995 to 2001 remains constant. 
This variable, therefore, introduces observed time-invariant effects.   16 
The transformed data set with mean, standard deviation and minimum and maximum 
value for each of the variable is reported in Table 4.1
6. The descriptive statistics show 
that the dataset is unbalanced, which is amenable to estimation methods that manage 
potential heterogeneity bias. Table 4.1 also depicts that income inequality has decreased 
slightly between 1995 and 2000.  Human capital inequalities followed a similar declining 
trend over the period of analysis. 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Dedinition  Year  Source  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
IGE1  1995  ECHP  94  0.42  0.16  0.18  0.83 
  1996    102  0.38  0.17  0.11  0.79 
  1997    102  0.38  0.16  0.14  0.79 
  1998    102  0.38  0.15  0.11  0.72 
  1999    102  0.37  0.15  0.12  0.72 
  2000    102  0.36  0.14  0.11  0.74 
 
Income 
inequality 
(Theil index) 
1995-00    604  0.38  0.15  0.11  0.83 
IMN  1995  ECHP  94  9.76  3.54  3.40  18.93 
  1996    102  10.39  3.51  3.43  19.02 
  1997    102  11.30  3.71  3.52  19.09 
  1998    102  11.39  3.74  3.79  19.89 
  1999    102  12.00  3.95  3.88  20.88 
  2000    102  12.81  4.55  4.05  21.14 
 
Income per 
capita 
(/1000) 
1995-00    604  11.30  3.96  3.40  21.14 
EMN  1995  ECHP  94  0.66  0.24  0.12  1.17 
  1996    94  0.66  0.24  0.12  1.15 
  1997    102  0.69  0.24  0.12  1.13 
  1998    102  0.83  0.30  0.18  1.28 
  1999    102  0.83  0.32  0.18  1.34 
  2000    102  0.80  0.27  0.19  1.23 
 
Average 
education 
level 
completed 
1995-00    596  0.75  0.28  0.12  1.34 
EGE1  1995  ECHP  94  0.90  0.45  0.21  2.38 
  1996    94  0.89  0.45  0.23  2.42 
  1997    102  0.86  0.46  0.23  2.42 
  1998    102  0.70  0.40  0.21  2.09 
  1999    102  0.72  0.42  0.20  2.06 
  2000    102  0.72  0.39  0.17  2.02 
 
Inequality 
on 
education 
level 
completed 
(Theil index) 
1995-00    596  0.79  0.44  0.17  2.42 
AGE  1995  ECHP  94  45.19  2.29  39.76  51.39 
  1996    94  44.90  1.93  41.64  50.80 
  1997    102  45.17  1.86  42.05  51.61 
  1998    102  45.48  1.83  42.40  51.12 
  1999    102  45.68  1.79  40.69  51.06 
  2000    102  45.96  1.86  42.32  51.35 
 
Average on 
age of 
respondents 
1995-00    596  45.40  1.95  39.76  51.61 
                                                 
6 Appendix A.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the ECHP quantitative and qualitative variables.   17 
LFSTOCK  1995  ECHP  94  0.52  0.07  0.34  0.68 
  1996    94  0.52  0.07  0.31  0.66 
  1997    102  0.52  0.08  0.34  0.68 
  1998    102  0.53  0.07  0.36  0.71 
  1999    102  0.54  0.08  0.36  0.73 
  2000    102  0.54  0.07  0.37  0.68 
 
Percentage 
of normally 
working 
(15+ 
hours/week) 
respondents 
(self-
defined)  1995-00    596  0.53  0.07  0.31  0.73 
ECACRA  1995  Eurostat  65  54.90  7.47  42.00  74.80 
  1996    90  57.03  6.94  41.50  72.60 
  1997    90  56.96  6.91  41.80  72.50 
  1998    92  57.34  6.56  42.50  72.30 
  1999    94  57.80  6.64  42.40  72.70 
  2000    94  57.89  6.61  42.90  74.50 
 
Economic 
acrivity rate 
of total 
population 
1995-00    525  57.10  6.85  41.50  74.80 
UNEM  1995  ECHP  94  0.06  0.03  0.00  0.17 
  1996    94  0.06  0.03  0.02  0.16 
  1997    102  0.06  0.03  0.01  0.15 
  1998    102  0.05  0.03  0.00  0.15 
  1999    102  0.05  0.03  0.00  0.15 
  2000    102  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.15 
 
Percentage 
of 
unemployed 
respondents 
(self-
defined) 
1995-00    596  0.05  0.03  0.00  0.17 
INACTIVE  1995  ECHP  94  0.42  0.06  0.29  0.55 
  1996    94  0.43  0.06  0.31  0.56 
  1997    102  0.42  0.06  0.29  0.57 
  1998    102  0.42  0.06  0.29  0.56 
  1999    102  0.42  0.06  0.27  0.57 
  2000    102  0.42  0.06  0.30  0.55 
 
Percentage 
of inactive 
respondents 
(self-
defined) 
1995-00    596  0.42  0.06  0.27  0.57 
ECACRF  1995  Eurostat  65  44.78  10.82  24.00  72.20 
  1996    90  47.45  9.69  23.40  70.50 
  1997    90  47.52  9.42  23.70  71.20 
  1998    92  47.99  8.96  25.10  69.70 
  1999    94  48.87  9.13  26.20  71.30 
  2000    94  49.15  9.14  26.70  72.90 
 
Female 
economic 
activity rate 
1995-00    525  47.79  9.52  23.40  72.90 
URBANDPAV  1995  ECHP  63  0.61  0.24  0.11  1.00 
  1996    63  0.61  0.24  0.11  1.00 
  1997    63  0.61  0.24  0.11  1.00 
  1998    63  0.61  0.24  0.11  1.00 
  1999    63  0.61  0.24  0.11  1.00 
  2000    63  0.61  0.24  0.11  1.00 
 
Percentage 
of 
respondents 
who live in a 
densely 
populated 
area 
1995-00    378  0.61  0.24  0.11  1.00 
Source: ECHP data set and Eurostat’s Regio data set 
The  qualitative  explanatory  variables  (time-invariant)  organise  regions into categories 
that are hypothesised to have some underlying similarity concerning welfare regimes, 
religion and family structure. 
·  Welfare regime: Although the level of welfare is reflected in areas such as power, 
industrialization  and  capitalist  contradictions,  social  expenditure  can  be   18 
considered as a good proxy of a state’s commitment to welfare (Esping-Andersen, 
1990).  Following  the  work  of  Esping-Andersen  (1990),  Ferarra  (1996)  and 
Berthoud  and  Iacovou  (2004),  we  use  four  welfare  state  categories:  social-
democratic (Sweden, Denmark), liberal (UK, Ireland), corporatist or conservatism 
(Luxembourg, Belgium, France,  Germany,  Austria)  and residual or ‘Southern’ 
(Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece). The hypothesis here is that a country’s welfare 
policy  has  an  important  effect  on  income  redistribution  and  thus  on  income 
inequalities. The above classification assumes that a country belongs to only one 
welfare  state  regime.  In  reality,  there  is  no  single  pure  case  because  the 
Scandinavian countries, for instance, may be predominantly social democratic, 
but they are not free of liberal elements (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.28). 
·  Religion: European regions’ religious affiliation is classified into four categories
7: 
mainly  Protestant  (Sweden,  Denmark,  Northern  Germany,  Scotland),  mainly 
Catholic (France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Austria, Southern 
Germany, Belgium), mainly Anglican (England) and mainly Orthodox (Greece). 
It is hypothesised that regions with the same religion have close social links so at 
to have similar income inequality levels within-groups of religion, but different 
inequality between-groups. 
·  Family structure: Following the work of Berthoud and Iacovou (2004), we use 
three groups of countries in the study of living arrangement: Nordic (Sweden, 
Denmark), North/Central (UK, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Austria) 
and Southern/Catholic (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece). The hypothesis is 
that a country’s family structure plays a significant role in income inequality. 
There  is  a  strong  overlap  between  the  classification  systems.  For  instance,  social 
democratic welfare state category perfectly overlaps with Nordic family structure one. 
Therefore  it  is  not  possible  to  discern  whether  differences  among  categories  are 
                                                 
7 Sources: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook;  
http://commons.wikimidia.org/wiki/Image:Europe_religion_map_de.png; 
http://csi-int.org/world_map_europa_religion.php     19 
attributable to welfare state, religion or family structure (Berthoud and Iacovou, 2004, 
p.9). 
5. Regression results 
The empirical analysis exploits the panel structure of the dataset, for the 102 EU regions 
included in the analysis over the period 1995-2000, using pooled OLS, FEs and REs 
estimation of the static models and by GMM estimation of the dynamic models taking 
into account the unobserved regional-specific effects. We first report the static regression 
models and then the dynamic ones. 
5.1 Estimations of the static model 
Table 5.1 reports the static regression results. Three types of static econometric models 
are  used:  pooled  OLS  (column  a),  FEs  (column  b)  and  REs  (column  c).  In  all  the 
regressions, the p-values of Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test strongly reject 
the validity of the pooled OLS models. The OLS coefficient estimates are affected by 
heterogeneity bias. We then address the heterogeneity bias problem with FEs and REs 
estimates. The p-values of Hausman’s test reject the GLS estimator as an appropriate 
alternative  to  the  FEs  estimator.  The  distinction  between  FEs  and  REs  models  is  an 
erroneous interpretation (Greene, 2000). According to the specification tests, FEs models 
are the most appropriate. Finally, there is no much difference between the significance of 
the homoskedasticity and the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 
Thus the determinants of income inequality are not sensitive to the model specification 
about the error term. 
In Regression 1 the impact of income per capita  ) (IMN  on income inequality  ) 1 (IGE  is 
analysed.  1a,  1b  and  1c  equations  are  unconditioned  by  any  other  effects.  In  OLS 
regression  (1a equation),  the coefficient of  IMN  is negative, which  suggests  that  an 
increase in 1000 Euro of income per capita are associated with, on average, about 0.0253 
less income inequality measured by Theil index. In 1b equation, the relationship between 
income per capita and inequality is negative as well, but it is not statistically significant. 
The adjusted R-squared shows that income per capita does not explain any variation in 
income inequality in the sample. In terms of goodness-of-fit, it is likely to indicate a poor   20 
unconditioned model. In the REs unconditioned model (1c equation) income per capita is 
negatively  correlated  with  income  inequality  and  is  statistically  significant.  Yet  the 
negative  association  between  income  per  capita  and  income  inequality  is,  however, 
sensitive to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. While in the pooled OLS 
conditional regressions the association remains negative. This behaviour corresponds to 
the declining segment of the Kuznets’ curve. The link between income and inequality 
becomes negative for relatively wealthy regions, when a large percentage of workers 
becomes employed in high value added jobs. In the FEs and REs conditional regressions 
income  per  capita  is,  in  contrast,  positively  correlated  with  income  inequality.  In  all 
regressions, the coefficients for income per capita are very low. These findings indicate 
that the effect of income per capita on inequality is not robust as it is sensitive to the 
model specification. The relationship between both factors is offset or reinforced by the 
other explanatory variables. Factors that offset this positive relationship are education 
inequality  ) 1 (EGE ,  the  average  age  of  respondents  ) (AGE ,  the  unemployment  level 
) (UNEM  and the inactivity level  ) (INACTIVE . In contrast, the relationship is negative, 
and  reinforced  by  the  labour  force  stock  ) (LFSTOCK ,  the  educational  attainment 
) (EMN , the economic activity of the total population  ) (ECACRA  and that of female 
participation in the labour force  ) (ECACRF  and the urbanization degree  ) (URBANDPA  
(Appendix  A.2).  Taking  into  account  that  FEs  models  are  the  most  appropriate,  the 
relationship between income inequality and income per capita is negative (Regression 3-
8). 
The next step of analysis is the introduction of human capital distribution measured by 
educational attainment and educational inequality. First, OLS regressions (2a, 3a and 4a 
equations)  imply  that  the  higher  the  educational  attainment,  the  lower  the  income 
inequality. These regressions point in the direction that regional educational achievement 
has  a  positive  influence  on  the  resulting  income  distribution.  A  higher  educational 
attainment  increases  the  occupational  choices  and  the  earning  opportunities  of  the 
population as a whole, making societies more egalitarian. Education seems to facilitate 
numerous favourable changes for individuals, because it reflects abilities, choices and 
preferences (Hannum and Buchman, 2005). Besides, compulsory education is publicly   21 
and freely provided in all European countries. The negative correlation between income 
inequality and educational attainment is also likely to reflect a ‘wage compression’ effect, 
whereby the supply is larger than the demand of educated labour. Adding, however, more 
control variables (4c, 6a, 6c, 7a, 8a, 8c, 10a and 10c equations), the impact of educational 
attainment on income inequality is positive. This positive correlation is likely to depict 
the ‘composition’ effect (Knight and Sabot, 1983). An increase in the levels of education 
of the population tends to increase income inequality as the imperfect competition for 
positions  requiring  advanced  educational  credentials  increases  the  wages  of  educated 
people  even  more.  In  all  models,  the  educational  attainment  coefficients  of  FEs 
regressions are not statistically significant. Our empirical results also show that a highly 
unequal  distribution  of  education  level  completed  is  associated  to  higher  income 
inequality.  This  relationship  is  robust  and  statistically  significant.  A  greater  share  of 
highly educated workers within a region may signal to the employers that those with less 
education have lower ability, which may also lead to larger wage between high-educated 
and low-educated workers and thus higher income inequality. Another explanation is that 
the demand for unskilled labour is growing at a slower rate than the demand for skilled 
labour. Hence, the positive relationship seems to interpret the responsiveness of the EU 
labour market to differences in qualifications and skills.  
The remaining regressions include the control variables described earlier. Regression 3 
tests for the influence of the average age of respondents. The fact that age matters for 
income inequality is hardly surprising, as regions with a younger population will also 
tend to have a lower rate of participation in the labour force and young people in work 
will earn less in la labour market that rewards seniority (Higgins and Williamson, 1999). 
In order to capture the economic activity characteristics of the regions, the percentage of 
normally working respondents (micro approach of economic activity) and the economic 
activity rate of total population (macro approach of economic activity) are included in 
Regression 4 and 5, respectively. As expected, both variables are negatively associated 
with  income  inequality  and  are  statistically  significant.  The  higher  the  level  of  the 
economic activity of a region, the lower the income inequality, reflecting that one of the 
main factors determining income inequality is access to work.   22 
This  point  is  further  confirmed  by  the  introduction  of  unemployment  (UNEM )  and 
inactivity levels (INACTIVE ) within a region, as well as by participation in the labour 
market by sex (ECACRF ) in Regressions 6 and 7 respectively. The results indicate that 
high  unemployment  and  inactivity  are  associated  with  higher  income  inequality. 
Increases in unemployment and inactivity aggravate the relative position of low-income 
groups, because marginal workers with the relatively low skills are at the bottom of the 
income  distribution  and  their  jobs  are  at  greater  risk  during  an  economic  downturn 
(Mocan, 1995). Additionally, unemployment insurance, welfare benefits and other forms 
of  income support are not enough  to  offset  the  loss  on income due  to  the  transitory 
unemployment. In other words, income received through a government transfer payments 
is lower than the income earned through employment. The effect of unemployment and 
inactivity  on  income  inequality  also  reflects  the  inflexibility  of  the  European  labour 
market.  European  labour  conditions,  such  as  the  degree  of  centralization  in  wage 
bargaining,  the  existence  of  a  minimum  wage,  the  differences  among  countries  with 
regard to recruitment and dismissal legislation and the differences among the European 
countries concerning unemployment benefit, job-creation policies and vocational training 
programmes  (Ayala  et  al.,  2002),  represent  an  important  factor  for  the  differences 
observed in income inequality across European regions. From a broader perspective, the 
high structural unemployment which characterises most European societies is likely to 
cause loss of current output and fiscal burden, loss of freedom and social exclusion, skill 
loss  and  long-run  damage,  psychological  harm,  ill  health,  motivational  loss,  and 
organisational inflexibility among others, which in turn increase income inequality (Sen, 
1997). The coefficients for female economic activity rate in all regressions are negative 
and significant. The impact of the increase in female economic activity rate (Table 4.1) 
has been to lessen the trend toward greater income inequality caused by aspects of social 
change during the period of analysis (Ryscavage et al., 1992).  
In  Regression  8,  we  include  urbanisation.  The  correlation  between  urbanisation  and 
inequality is negative. These results underline that European societies are located in the 
the declining segment of the Kuznets curve. This rejects Estudillo’s hypothesis (1997) 
that the heterogeneity of urban areas enhances, rather than lowers, inequality. Highly 
urbanised regions seem not only to be more economically prosperous – the correlation   23 
between  IMN  and URBANDPA is positive (0.46) – but also to have less inequality, as a 
consequence of the negative relationship between income per capita and inequality.  
We  finally  estimate  the  impact  of  the  qualitative  explanatory  variables  on  income 
inequality
8. FEs estimator is not provided because there is no any within-group variation 
in  the  dummy  variables.  In  Regression  9,  the  omitted  category  is  social-democratic 
welfare  states.  The  regression  results  show  that  all  welfare  regimes  are  important 
determinants  of  income  inequality.  Social-democratic  welfare  states,  which  in  theory 
promote  a  higher  standard  of  equality,  have  indeed  lower  income  inequality  than 
conservative welfare states in which private insurance and occupational benefits play a 
truly  marginal  role  and  corporatism  displaces  the  market  as  a  provider  of  welfare 
(Esping-Andersen,  1990).  Social-democratic  welfare  states  are  more  egalitarian  than 
corporatist ones because, in the former, the welfare state minimises dependence on the 
family and allows women greater freedom to choose work rather than to stay at home, 
while, in the latter, state intervention is more modest and kicks off mainly when the 
family’s capacity to service its members becomes exhausted (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Corporatist welfare states have lower income inequality than liberal welfare states in 
which ‘means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social insurance 
plans predominate’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.26). The latter also are more egalitarian 
than ‘Southern’ (or residual) welfare states.  
Regression 10 introduces religion as an explanatory variable. We use mainly Protestant 
regions as our base category. All categories seem to be important determinants of income 
inequality,  with  mainly  Protestant  regions  having  a  higher  income  inequality  than 
Catholic ones which, in turn, are more egalitarian than Anglican ones (10c equation). 
Orthodox regions have the most inegalitarian societies. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that  all  family  structure  and  living  arrangements  categories  affect  income  inequality 
significantly (Regression 11). Nordic family structure regions are the most egalitarian 
societies and Southern/Catholic have the highest inequality.   
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Considering  the  standardised  coefficients  of  the  above  regressions  (Appendix  A.4)
9, 
female economic activity rate explains the largest variation in income inequality and is 
also robust to specification model. The impact of both micro and macro approaches of 
economic activity on income inequality is high as well. In contrast, the average age of 
respondents, the level of urbanisation, the liberal welfare state, Anglicanism, and Nordic 
family explain only a relative small part of the total variation in income inequality. 
---------- Insert Table 5.1: Static regression model ---------- 
5.2 Estimations of the dynamic model 
Table 5.2 presents results for the dynamic income inequality equations (Arellano-Bond 
estimator). The first column of each model specification assumes that the explanatory 
variables are strictly exogenous. The last two columns show the GMM results for the 
same  model  specification  regarding  that  the  explanatory  variables  are  predetermined 
(column b) or endogenous (column c). All the parameters are short-run, while the long-
run  ones  are  reported  at  the  bottom  of  each  regression  at  the  table.  Therefore,  by 
employing a dynamic panel data approach, we can distinguish between the short-run and 
the long-run evolution of the income inequality determinants in the EU. 
First of all, if the explanatory variables, on the one hand, are strictly exogenous, the 
specification tests are satisfactory. More specifically, the tests regarding serial correlation 
reject  the  absence  of  first  order,  but  not  second  order  serial  correlation  in  both  the 
homoskedastic and robust case. The Sargan test statistics of overidentifying restrictions 
do not indicate correlation between the instruments and the error term. If the explanatory 
variables, on the other, are predetermined (except for the average age of respondents), the 
specification  tests  are  not  satisfactory  enough.  There  is  significant  negative  serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals of first order in both the homoskedastic and 
robust case but not of the second order, except for Regression 6b where the second order 
serial correlation is rejected in the homoskedastic case. Additionally, the Sargan tests 
indicate correlation between the instruments and the error term of the first-differenced 
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equation. Finally, if the explanatory variables are assumed to be endogenous (except for 
the average age of respondents), our estimates perform well based on the specification 
tests. The tests regarding serial correlation, once again, reject the absence of first order 
serial correlation in both homoskedastic and robust estimator of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the parameter estimates, but not the second order serial correlation except for 
Regression 6c in the homoskedastic case. Although the size of the instrument matrix 
increases quickly when the explanatory variables are endogenous, the Sargan tests do not 
indicate correlation between the instruments and the error term of the first-differenced 
equation. Taking into account the specification tests applied to the estimated dynamic 
models,  6c  equation  (homoskedastic  case)  where  the  explanatory  variables  are 
endogenous is the most appropriate. In this equation, there is significant negative serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals of both first order and second order.  
Generally  speaking,  the  exogenous,  predetermined  and  endogenous  parameters  are 
similar to each other, denoting the robustness of the dynamic results. First, all equations 
reject  the  lagged  income  inequality  coefficient  is  zero.  The  coefficient  of  lagged 
dependent variable is higher when the explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous 
except for Regression 1. Additionally, the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable 
are statistically significant at the 1% level in both homoskedastic and robust case. It was 
expected  to  find  that  income  inequality  in  the  current  period  depends  on  income 
inequality of the previous period. The rationale for this result is simple, because income 
inequality does not change very quickly over one year and job mobility which is the main 
source  of  their  personal  income  is  rather  low,  for  psychological,  technological  and 
institutional reasons. 
Regression  1  depicts  that  income  inequality  increases  in  the  short-run  as  the  current 
income  per  capita  increases  thus  leading  to  a  positive  correlation  between  the  two 
variables,  while  the  correlation  between  the  lagged  income  per  capita  and  income 
inequality is negative and statistically significant only when income per capita is assumed 
to be a strictly exogenous variable. Besides, the long-run coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant in most equations. For instance, if the strictly exogenous income is 
increased by 1%, income inequality will rise by 0.0139 in the short-run and 0.0331 in the   26 
long-run. This rejects the declining segment of the Kuznets curve, but is likely to accept 
Lydall’s (1977) hypothesis that only a limited number of people can be transferred to 
higher levels of skills, while the remainder have to wait their turn. 
The results also indicate that income inequality declines over time for a region as the 
current human capital variables (educational attainment and human capital inequality) 
decline and as the lagged ones increase. Both the current and the lagged human capital 
variables are statistically significant in most equations. According to the estimated value 
and assuming, for example, that human capital variables are endogenous, a 1% increase 
in coefficient of educational attainment would lead in the short-run to a 0.2503% increase 
and in the long-run to a 0.3018% increase in the level of income inequality (Regression 
2).  Additionally,  due  to  the  negative  relationship  between  the  lagged  educational 
achievement and income inequality, the latter reacts to the European labour market with a 
lag  of  one  year.  The  European  labour  market  decisions  and  the  effectiveness  of  the 
European  social  system  take  time  to  implement,  since  the  educated  labour  supply  is 
relatively more expanded to lagged demand. The effects of educational attainment and 
educational inequality obtained after full adjustment of income inequality (the long-run 
effects) are positive and statistically significant only when education is endogenous (2c, 
3c and 4c equation). The negative long-run relationship between income and educational 
inequality  highlights  the  responsiveness  of  EU  labour  market  to  differences  in 
qualifications and skills. 
The short-run coefficient of the current average age of respondents within a region is 
positively correlated with income inequality and with very low statistical significance 
(Regression 3). However, the current effect of  AGE  is slight. Alternatively, the lagged 
average  age  is  negatively  correlated  with  income  inequality  but  not  statistically 
significant.  The  long-run effect of  average  age on inequality  is  positive  which  could 
reflect that with greater longevity, there will be a growing number of elderly people and 
since  their  income  is  lower  than  the  young,  an  increasing  number  of  elderly  people 
should lead to a rise in the number of households with low income (Estudillo, 1997, p. 
68), but this variable is not statistically significant.   27 
Regression 4 (4a and 4b equation) shows that the labour force stock has a positive effect 
on  income  inequality,  but  is  not  statistically  significant.  Nevertheless,  the  impact  of 
economic activity has the expected sign (negative) and is statistically significant at the 
1% level in the long-run (Regression 5). High unemployment is associated with higher 
inequality in the long-run (6c equation). This outcome is consistent with the outcome of 
the  static  regression  models  denoting  the  robustness  of  the  relationship  between 
unemployment and inequality. The dynamic models are likely to allow testing whether 
changes in the short-term (cyclical) and long-term (structural) unemployment influence 
changes in income inequality. The short-run and long-run impact of unemployment on 
inequality has the right sign with respect to the literature and the static regression models. 
Finally, the impact of the female economic activity rate on income inequality is negative 
and statistically significant no matter what this explanatory variable is assumed to be.  
To sum up, 6c equation performs well based on the specification tests. In this equation, 
the  unemployment  and  the  female  participation  in  the  labour  force  are  the  most 
significant  factors  determining  income  inequality  within  European  regions.  More 
specifically, the higher the unemployment level, the higher the income inequality; and the 
higher the female participation, the lower the income inequality.     
---------- Insert Table 5.2: Dynamic regression model ---------- 
 
6. Concluding remarks and further research 
Different  static  and  dynamic  panel  data  analyses  have  been  conducted  in  order  to 
examine  how  microeconomic  changes  in  human  capital  distribution  in  terms  of  both 
educational  attainment  and  educational  inequality  affect  the  short-term  evolution  of 
income inequality across regions of the EU over the period 1995-2000. Our methodology 
incorporates variability both across regions and over time. The advantage of dynamic 
over  static  models  is  that  persistence  over  time  is  not  only  due  to  the  unobserved 
regional-specific  effects,  but  also  due  to  the  presence  of  a  lagged  income  inequality 
among  the  regressors.  Autoregressive  models  highlight  the  persistence  in  income 
inequality, because income distribution does not change quickly over time. Since the   28 
estimated  coefficient  of  the  lagged  dependent  variable  is  high  and  significant  in  all 
dynamic specifications, the estimated long-run coefficients of the explanatory variables 
are less efficient and biased.  
Taking  into  account  the  specification  tests  applied  to  the  estimated  models,  the 
relationship between income per capita and income inequality seems to be positive. If so, 
income  per  capita  does  not  alleviate  the  inequality  increase,  rejecting  the  declining 
segment  of  the  Kuznets  curve.  Considering  the  FEs  models  which  are  the  most 
appropriate  in  static  analysis,  our  results  show  that,  while  the  impact  of  educational 
attainment on income inequality is not clear, educational inequality is associated with 
higher  income  inequality.  The  dynamic  models  show  that,  in  the  long-run,  both 
educational  attainment  and  educational  inequality  are  positively  associated  with 
inequality,  but  this  relationship  is  statistically  significant  only  when  the  explanatory 
variables are endogenous. The impact of the average age of respondents and inactivity 
within  a  region  on  income  inequality  is  sensitive  to  the  specification  model. 
Unemployment is positively associated to income inequality. Taking into account the 
urbanisation  level,  an  increasing  weight  of  the  urban  relative  to  the  rural  population 
means  a  decreasing  income  inequality.  The  economic  activity  rate  is  negatively 
associated with the observed income inequality. Finally, our results show that the social 
democratic welfare states, the mainly Protestant regions and those with Nordic family 
structures are among the most egalitarian. 
Our  results  have  important  policy  implications  as  they  shed  light  on  the  ambiguous 
impact of income per capita on income inequality. They show that improving access to 
education, providing higher quality of education, and generally, increasing educational 
attainment may have not any effect on income inequality. They also indicate that income 
and human capital inequality are synonymous, highlighting the responsiveness of the EU 
labour market to differences in qualifications and skills.  
Although our methodology seems to address the question of how changes in income per 
capita,  educational  attainment  and  education  inequality  affect  the  observed  income 
inequality, further research is needed. The fact that only a limited time period is available 
advises  caution  when  interpreting  the  results.  Longer  time  series  will  reinforce  the   29 
analysis, as would the use of other inequality indices, such as the Gini coefficient, the 
relative mean deviation index, or the squared coefficient of variation, in order to check 
the  sensitivity  of  inequality  indexes.  Another  suggestion  for  further  research  is  that 
dynamic models can also be estimated by Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond estimator 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
A potential limitation of our analysis – which is also a limitation in most cross-sectional 
studies  –  is  the  fact  that  regions  are  more  homogeneous  than  countries,  because  the 
regions are subunits of a single national entity (Nielson and Alderson, 1997). Regions 
cannot cover as wide a range of variation in income and human capital distribution, in 
levels  of  economic  development  and  in  some  unobserved  characteristics  such  as 
institutions and socio-cultural conditions as a cross-national sample. Regional boundaries 
may not define autonomous and internally integrated socioeconomic systems with respect 
to  distributional  process  (Nielson  and  Alderson,  1997).  Thus  the  administrative 
boundaries used  to  organise the  data  series  do  not coincide perfectly with the actual 
boundaries, arising spatial autocorrelation into data (Anselin and Rey, 1991). A spatial 
autocorrelation analysis may indicate whether income inequality and its determinants are 
randomly distributed over space or there are similarities among regions.  
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Appendix A.1: Descriptive statistics of ECHP data set 
Year  Statistic  Quantitative variables  Qualitative variables 
               Main activity status    
      Income 
Educational 
attainment  Age  Unemployed  Inactive 
Normally 
working  Urbanisation 
1995  Obs  120413  119463  125395  7915  55169  61406  26863 
   Mean   9744.58  0.60  44.96          
   Percentage        6.36  44.32  49.33  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  11782.83  0.73  18.23          
   Variance  1.39E+08  0.53  332.35          
   Skewness  8.39  0.78  0.34          
   Kurtosis  311.52  2.27  2.12             
1996  Obs  124663  114529  120413  7685  58933  53214  26863 
   Mean  10163.60  0.60  45.05          
   Percentage        6.41  44.41  49.18  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  11234.33  0.73  18.28          
   Variance  1.26E+08  0.53  334.28          
   Skewness  6.45  0.79  0.35          
   Kurtosis  205.83  2.27  2.12             
1997  Obs  117886  118402  124756  7760  54183  62221  26863 
   Mean  10472.71  0.62  45.22          
   Percentage        6.25  43.64  50.11  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  11529.87  0.74  18.32          
   Variance  1.33E+08  0.55  335.47          
   Skewness  6.87  0.73  0.34          
   Kurtosis  213.47  2.17  2.13             
1998  Obs  113455  115953  117980  6775  50646  59978  26863 
   Mean  10617.48  0.68  45.54          
   Percentage        5.77  43.14  51.09  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  12648.77  0.76  18.32          
   Variance  1.60E+08  0.57  335.66          
   Skewness  16.09  0.60  0.34          
   Kurtosis  1049.18  1.97  2.13             
1999  Obs  108731  112406  113536  5908  48802  58342  26863 
   Mean  11037.64  0.68  45.78          
   Percentage        5.23  43.17  51.61  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  13552.43  0.77  18.33          
   Variance  1.84E+08  0.59  336.04          
   Skewness  30.58  0.63  0.33          
   Kurtosis  3616.64  1.96  2.13             
2000  Obs  104953  107751  108848  5165  46890  56384  26863 
   Mean  11368.55  0.69  46.07          
   Percentage        4.76  43.24  52  46.68 
   Std. Dev.  12884.93  0.77  18.45          
   Variance  1.66E+08  0.59  340.32          
   Skewness  10.55  0.59  0.32          
   Kurtosis  442.83  1.92  2.12               37 
Appendix A.2: Correlation matrices 
Correlations: Regression 2 
   imn  emn  ege1 
imn  1.0000       
emn  0.7797  1.0000    
ege1  -0.7368  -0.8691  1.0000 
 
Correlations: Regression 3 
   imn  emn  ege1  age 
imn  1.0000          
emn  0.7797  1.0000       
ege1  -0.7368  -0.8691  1.0000    
age  -0.0802  -0.1744  0.2018  1.0000 
 
Correlations: Regression 4 
   imn  emn  ege1  age  lfstock 
imn  1.0000             
emn  0.7797  1.0000          
ege1  -0.7368  -0.8691  1.0000       
age  -0.0802  -0.1744  0.2018  1.0000    
lfstock  0.6323  0.6020  -0.4173  -0.1360  1.0000 
 
Correlations: Regression 5 
   imn  emn  ege1  age  ecacra 
imn  1.0000             
emn  0.7648  1.0000          
ege1  -0.7114  -0.8595  1.0000       
age  -0.0203  -0.1005  0.1137  1.0000    
ecacra  0.6149  0.6409  -0.4326  -0.0112  1.0000 
 
Correlations: Regression 6 
   imn  emn  ege1  age  unem  ecacrf 
imn  1.0000                
emn  0.7648  1.0000             
ege1  -0.7114  -0.8595  1.0000          
age  -0.0203  -0.1005  0.1137  1.0000       
unem  -0.4289  -0.2012  0.0517  -0.2562  1.0000    
ecacrf  0.6533  0.6734  -0.4806  0.0731  -0.4395  1.0000 
 
Correlations: Regression 7 
   imn  emn  ege1  age  inactive  ecacrf 
imn  1.0000                
emn  0.7648  1.0000             
ege1  -0.7114  -0.8595  1.0000          
age  -0.0203  -0.1005  0.1137  1.0000         38 
inactive  -0.6222  -0.6940  0.5607  0.2748  1.0000    
ecacrf  0.6533  0.6734  -0.4806  0.0731  -0.7831  1.0000 
 
Correlations: Regression 8 
   imn  emn  ege1  age  unem  ecacrf  urbandpav 
imn  1.0000                   
emn  0.8672  1.0000                
ege1  -0.7493  -0.8337  1.0000             
age  -0.0349  -0.0791  0.1096  1.0000          
unem  -0.4876  -0.3679  0.1555  -0.2999  1.0000       
ecacrf  0.7146  0.6233  -0.3360  0.0642  -0.7437  1.0000    
urbandpav  0.4553  0.4530  -0.2332  -0.0281  -0.3525  0.4603  1.0000 
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Appendix A.3: Dummy variables definition 
Variable  Definition 
Welfare state   
DWSSOC  Socialism (social democratic) 
DWSLIB  Liberal 
DWSCORP  Corporatist (conservatism) 
DWSRES  Residual (‘Southern’) 
Religion   
DRLPROT  Mainly Protestant 
DRLCATH  Mainly Catholic 
DRLORTH  Mainly Orthodox 
DRLANGL  Mainly Anglicans 
Family structure   
DFNORD  Nordic (Scandinavian) 
DFNC  North/Central 
DFSC  Southern/Catholic 
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Appendix A.4: Standardised coefficients 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IGE1 
(1995-2000) 
beta coefficient (OLS) 
  REGR. 1  REGR. 2  REGR. 3  REGR. 4  REGR. 5  REGR. 6  REGR. 7  REGR. 8  REGR. 9  REGR. 10  REGR. 11 
IMN  -0.6514  -0.3659  -0.3360  -0.0449  -0.1675  -0.0845  -0.1105  -0.2136  0.1853  0.0119  0.2155 
EMN    -0.5168  -0.5331  -0.1467  0.0171  0.0877  0.1149  0.1418  0.0544  0.1875  0.0672 
EGE1    -0.1598  -0.1185  0.2067  0.2553  0.2854  0.2460  0.1985  0.2357  0.3940  0.2484 
AGE      -0.1662  -0.2178  -0.1712  -0.0964  -0.1661  -0.0537  -0.1017  -0.1401  -0.0959 
LFSTOCK        -0.5644               
ECACRA          -0.5712             
UNEM            0.0531    0.1887  0.0971  0.0656  0.1132 
INACTIVE              0.1974         
ECACRF            -0.6773  -0.5612  -0.5035  -0.4992  -0.6110  -0.4832 
URBANDP
AV (fixed) 
             
-0.1148 
   
 
DWSLIB                  0.1024     
DWSCOR
P 
             
 
0.1144   
 
DWSRES                  0.5353     
DRLCATH                    0.1310   
DRLORTH                    0.2146   
DRLANGL                    -0.0295   
DFNORD                      -0.0641 
DFSC                      0.4668 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IGE1 
(1995-2000) 
  REGRESSION 1  REGRESSION 2  REGRESSION 3  REGRESSION 4 
  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs 
IMN  -0.0253 
(0.0012)*** 
(0.0014)*** 
-0.0001 
(0.0011) 
(0.0013) 
-0.0036 
(0.0011)*** 
(0.0013)*** 
-0.0140 
(0.0018)*** 
(0.0021)*** 
0.0016 
(0.0014) 
(0.0016) 
-0.0012 
(0.0014) 
(0.0015) 
-0.0129 
(0.0018)*** 
(0.0020)*** 
0.0026 
(0.0014)* 
(0.0017) 
-0.0009 
(0.0015) 
(0.0016) 
-0.0017 
(0.0016) 
(0.0018) 
0.0033 
(0.0014)** 
(0.0017)* 
0.0008 
(0.0015) 
(0.0015) 
EMN        -0.2817 
(0.0355)*** 
(0.0304)*** 
0.0396 
(0.0305) 
(0.0316) 
0.0371 
(0.0304) 
(0.0339) 
-0.2906 
(0.0347)*** 
(0.0285)*** 
0.0394 
(0.0303) 
(0.0318) 
0.0370 
(0.0305) 
(0.0340) 
-0.0800 
(0.0312)** 
(0.0263)*** 
0.0466 
(0.0301) 
(0.0309) 
0.0658 
(0.0298)*** 
(0.0310)*** 
EGE1        -0.0556 
(0.0210)*** 
(0.0199)*** 
0.0723 
(0.0230)*** 
(0.0231)*** 
0.0847 
(0.0222)*** 
(0.0267)*** 
-0.0412 
(0.0206)*** 
(0.0179)*** 
0.0732 
(0.0229)*** 
(0.0232)*** 
0.0879 
(0.0223)*** 
(0.0268)*** 
0.0719 
(0.0183)*** 
(0.0167)*** 
0.0685 
(0.0227)*** 
(0.0223)*** 
0.0901 
(0.0213)*** 
(0.0244)*** 
AGE       
     
-0.0130 
(0.0023)*** 
(0.0024)*** 
-0.0057 
(0.0022)** 
(0.0024)** 
-0.0042 
(0.0022)* 
(0.0025)* 
-0.0170 
(0.0019)*** 
(0.0019)*** 
-0.0059 
(0.0022)*** 
(0.0026)** 
-0.0056 
(0.0021)*** 
(0.0027)*** 
LFSTOCK             
     
-1.1632 
(0.0693)*** 
(0.0676)*** 
-0.2765 
(0.0837)*** 
(0.0981)*** 
-0.6963 
(0.0788)*** 
(0.0895)*** 
ECACRA                         
UNEM                         
INACTIVE                         
ECACRF                         
URBANDPAV 
(fixed) 
                   
 
 
YR96*URBAND
PAV 
                   
 
 
YR97*URBAND
PAV 
                       
YR98*URBAND
PAV 
                       
YR99*URBAND
PAV 
                       
YR00*URBAND
PAV 
                       
CONSTANT  0.6660 
(0.0144)*** 
(0.0165)*** 
0.3821 
(0.0121)*** 
(0.0151)*** 
0.4183 
(0.0166)*** 
(0.0189)*** 
0.7956 
(0.0414)*** 
(0.0443)*** 
0.2787 
(0.0382)*** 
(0.0396)*** 
0.2974 
(0.0393)*** 
(0.0473)*** 
1.3667 
(0.1087)*** 
(0.1136)*** 
0.5255 
(0.1022)*** 
(0.1072)*** 
0.4826 
(0.1027)*** 
(0.1212)*** 
1.7911 
(0.0930)*** 
(0.0879)*** 
0.6732 
(0.1106)*** 
(0.1220)*** 
0.8712 
(0.1078)*** 
(0.1379)*** 
ADJ R-SQ  0.4233  0.0000    0.4890  0.0313    0.5144  0.0445    0.6709  0.0654   
OBS.  604      596      596      596     
LM TEST 
(p-value) 
916.46 
(0.0000) 
    715.20 
(0.0000) 
    645.03 
(0.0000) 
    634.09 
(0.0000) 
   
HAUSMAN 
TEST 
(p-value) 
￿ 
 
71.46 
(0.0000) 
    ￿ 
 
289.07 
(0.0000) 
    ￿ 
 
35.86 
(0.0000) 
    ￿ 
 
87.27 
(0.0000) 
   
NOTES: OLS indicates ordinary least squares estimation without group dummy variables (OLS estimation of pooled data). FEs indicates fixed effects model based on mean 
centered data. REs indicates random effects model (GLS coefficients). (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  (*), (**), and (***) 
denotes the significance of the White (1980) estimator (robust standard errors). LM TEST is the Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman test for fixed or random effects (Hausman, 1978). ￿ denotes model fitted on non-robust (or robust) estimator fails to 
meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test; so we choose the robust (or non-robust) estimator.   
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  REGRESSION 5  REGRESSION 6  REGRESSION 7  REGRESSION 8 
  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs 
IMN  -0.0065 
(0.0015)*** 
(0.0016)*** 
0.0029 
(0.0016)* 
(0.0017)* 
-0.0001 
(0.0015) 
(0.0015) 
-0.0033 
(0.0015)** 
(0.0017)* 
0.0046 
(0.0016)*** 
(0.0017)*** 
0.0020 
(0.0015) 
(0.0015)*** 
-0.0043 
(0.0014)*** 
(0.0014)*** 
0.0039 
(0.0016)** 
(0.0018)** 
0.0014 
(0.0015) 
(0.0015) 
-0.0076 
(0.0024)*** 
(0.0028)*** 
0.0110 
(0.0025)*** 
(0.0027)*** 
0.0020 
(0.0017) 
(0.0017) 
EMN  0.0097 
(0.0331) 
(0.0315) 
0.0018 
(0.0306) 
(0.0293) 
0.0175 
(0.0286) 
(0.0293) 
0.0498 
(0.0298)* 
(0.0288)* 
0.0136 
(0.0298) 
(0.0276) 
0.0359 
(0.0275) 
(0.0270)*** 
0.0652 
(0.0295)** 
(0.0286)** 
0.0101 
(0.0305) 
(0.0285) 
0.0386 
(0.0278) 
(0.0278) 
0.0710 
(0.0375)* 
(0.0381)* 
0.0222 
(0.0396) 
(0.0415) 
0.0697 
(0.0318)** 
(0.0342)** 
EGE1  0.0961 
(0.0189)*** 
(0.0181)*** 
0.0313 
(0.0224) 
(0.0197) 
0.0519 
(0.0202)** 
(0.0205)** 
0.1074 
(0.0175)*** 
(0.0166)*** 
0.0330 
(0.0218) 
(0.0184)* 
0.0600 
(0.0193)*** 
(0.0182)*** 
0.0926 
(0.0166)*** 
(0.0152)*** 
0.0361 
(0.0222) 
(0.0188)* 
0.0591 
(0.0194)*** 
(0.0181)*** 
0.0700 
(0.0217)*** 
(0.0185)*** 
0.0831 
(0.0302)*** 
(0.0374)** 
0.0802 
(0.0255)*** 
(0.0282)*** 
AGE  -0.0138 
(0.0019)*** 
(0.0018)*** 
-0.0082 
(0.0022)*** 
(0.0025)*** 
-0.0078 
(0.0020)*** 
(0.0021)*** 
-0.0078 
(0.0018)*** 
(0.0018)*** 
-0.0053 
(0.0022)** 
(0.0025)** 
-0.0044 
(0.0020)** 
(0.0020)*** 
-0.0134 
(0.0020)*** 
(0.0022)*** 
-0.0073 
(0.0022)*** 
(0.0024)*** 
-0.0069 
(0.0020)*** 
(0.0022)*** 
-0.0041 
(0.0023)* 
(0.0022)* 
-0.0073 
(0.0027)*** 
(0.0026)*** 
-0.0061 
(0.0026)** 
(0.0025)** 
LFSTOCK                         
ECACRA  -0.0134 
(0.0008)*** 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.0089 
(0.0014)*** 
(0.0016)*** 
-0.0131 
(0.0010)*** 
(0.0011)***                   
UNEM        0.2519 
(0.1304)* 
(0.1352)* 
0.5541 
(0.1404)*** 
(0.1515)*** 
0.3933 
(0.1301)*** 
(0.1402)***       
0.8557 
(0.2080)*** 
(0.1794)*** 
0.4594 
(0.2069)** 
(0.2305)** 
0.5955 
(0.2030)*** 
(0.2215)*** 
INACTIVE              0.4937 
(0.1052)*** 
(0.1141)*** 
0.0084 
(0.0933) 
(0.1080) 
0.1725 
(0.0882)* 
(0.0894)*   
 
   
ECACRF        -0.0116 
(0.0006)*** 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.0068 
(0.0012)*** 
(0.0013)*** 
-0.0111 
(0.0008)*** 
(0.0008)*** 
-0.0096 
(0.0007)*** 
(0.0008)*** 
-0.0079 
(0.0012)*** 
(0.0013)*** 
-0.0110 
(0.0008)*** 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.0083 
(0.0010)*** 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.0020 
(0.0017) 
(0.0017) 
-0.0083 
(0.0011)*** 
(0.0012)*** 
URBANDPAV 
(fixed) 
                  -0.0736 
(0.0215)*** 
(0.0211)***   
-0.1538 
(0.0467)*** 
(0.0446)*** 
YR96*URBAND
PAV 
                 
 
-0.0290 
(0.0148)* 
(0.0151)* 
 
YR97*URBAND
PAV 
                 
 
-0.0453 
(0.0150)*** 
(0.0136)*** 
 
YR98*URBAND
PAV 
                 
 
-0.0136 
(0.0163) 
(0.0147) 
 
YR99*URBAND
PAV 
                 
 
-0.0374 
(0.0174)** 
(0.0170)** 
 
YR00*URBAND
PAV 
                 
 
-0.0743 
(0.0184)*** 
(0.0171)*** 
 
CONSTANT  1.7736 
(0.0943)*** 
(0.0815)*** 
1.2128 
(0.1333)*** 
(0.1438)*** 
1.4366 
(0.1123)*** 
(0.1239)*** 
1.1955 
(0.0939)*** 
(0.0864)*** 
0.8348 
(0.1195)*** 
(0.1213)*** 
0.9957 
(0.1029)*** 
(0.1038)*** 
1.1734 
(0.0849)*** 
(0.0734)*** 
1.0108 
(0.1153)*** 
(0.1182)*** 
1.0633 
(0.0991)*** 
(0.1038)*** 
0.9526 
(0.1245)*** 
(0.1081)*** 
0.6300 
(0.1611)*** 
(0.1640)*** 
0.9907 
(0.1375)*** 
(0.1448)*** 
ADJ R-SQ  0.7139  0.1343    0.7674  0.1743    0.7755  0.1432    0.7672  0.2704   
OBS.  513      513      513      299     
LM TEST 
(p-value) 
715.68 
(0.0000) 
    676.43 
(0.0000) 
    630.60 
(0.0000) 
    322.72 
(0.0000) 
   
HAUSMAN 
TEST 
(p-value) 
46.71 
(0.0000) 
46.86 
(0.0000) 
    54.24 
(0.0000) 
61.67 
(0.0000) 
    73.32 
(0.0000) 
37.77 
(0.0000) 
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  REGRESSION 9  REGRESSION 10  REGRESSION 11   
  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs       
IMN  0.0072 
(0.0018)*** 
(0.0021)***   
0.0053 
(0.0015)*** 
(0.0015)*** 
0.0005 
(0.0015) 
(0.0017)   
0.0030 
(0.0015)** 
(0.0014)** 
0.0084 
(0.0018)*** 
(0.0020)***   
0.0054 
(0.0015)*** 
(0.0015)***       
EMN  0.0309 
(0.0338) 
(0.0358)   
0.0189 
(0.0272) 
(0.0266) 
0.1064 
(0.0340)*** 
(0.0372)***   
0.0496 
(0.0276)* 
(0.0290)* 
0.0381 
(0.0283) 
(0.0296)   
0.0230 
(0.0260) 
(0.0259)       
EGE1  0.0887 
(0.0187)*** 
(0.0192)***   
0.0446 
(0.0192)** 
(0.0173)** 
0.1483 
(0.0188)*** 
(0.0198)***   
0.0684 
(0.0194)*** 
(0.0208)*** 
0.0935 
(0.0164)*** 
(0.0173)***   
0.0477 
(0.0182)*** 
(0.0170)***       
AGE  -0.0082 
(0.0017)*** 
(0.0017)***   
-0.0061 
(0.0019)*** 
(0.0020)*** 
-0.0113 
(0.0018)*** 
(0.0017)***   
-0.0058 
(0.0020)*** 
(0.0020)*** 
-0.0077 
(0.0017)*** 
(0.0016)***   
-0.0061 
(0.0019)*** 
(0.0020)***       
LFSTOCK                         
ECACRA                         
UNEM  0.4602 
(0.1410)*** 
(0.1380)***   
0.5059 
(0.1272)*** 
(0.1374)*** 
0.3112 
(0.1384)** 
(0.1431)**   
0.4550 
(0.1300)*** 
(0.1436)*** 
0.5367 
(0.1264)*** 
(0.1362)***   
0.5122 
(0.1248)*** 
(0.1374)***   
   
INACTIVE                         
ECACRF  -0.0085 
(0.0007)*** 
(0.0007)***   
-0.0073 
(0.0009)*** 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.0104 
(0.0006)*** 
(0.0006)***   
-0.0089 
(0.0008)*** 
(0.0010)*** 
-0.0082 
(0.0007)*** 
(0.0007)***   
-0.0072 
(0.0009)*** 
(0.0009)***   
   
URBANDPAV 
(fixed)               
   
 
   
DWSLIB  0.0356 
(0.0185)* 
(0.0166)**   
0.0621 
(0.0284)** 
(0.0241)**               
   
DWSCORP  0.0374 
(0.0169)** 
(0.0154)**   
0.0594 
(0.0291)** 
(0.0249)**             
     
DWSRES  0.1814 
(0.0261)*** 
(0.0291)***   
0.2259 
(0.0357)*** 
(0.0301)***             
     
DRLCATH 
     
0.0408 
(0.0109)*** 
(0.0112)***   
0.0955 
(0.0221)*** 
(0.0248)***   
         
DRLORTH 
     
0.1584 
(0.0196)*** 
(0.0179)*** 
  0.2243 
(0.0411)*** 
(0.0373)*** 
           
DRLANGL 
     
-0.0104 
(0.0122) 
(0.0127) 
  0.0262 
(0.0219) 
(0.0248) 
           
DFNC 
       
    -0.0402 
(0.0163)** 
(0.0145)*** 
  -0.0599 
(0.0265)** 
(0.0222)*** 
     
DFSC 
       
    0.1566 
(0.0147)*** 
(0.0179)*** 
  0.1680 
(0.0200)*** 
(0.0193)*** 
     
CONSTANT  0.8896 
(0.1020)*** 
(0.0997)***   
0.7697 
(0.1117)*** 
(0.1096)*** 
1.1565 
(0.0927)*** 
(0.0873)*** 
  0.8613 
(0.1060)*** 
(0.1160)*** 
0.8602 
(0.0942)*** 
(0.0922)*** 
  0.8163 
(0.1005)*** 
(0.0989)*** 
     
ADJ R-SQ  0.8022      0.7978      0.8097           
OBS.  513      513      513           
LM TEST 
(p-value) 
752.96 
(0.0000) 
    655.71 
(0.0000) 
    740.08 
(0.0000) 
         
HAUSMAN                           44 
TEST 
(p-value) 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IGE1 
Arellano-Bond estimator 
(1995-2000) 
  REGRESSION 1  REGRESSION 2  REGRESSION 3  REGRESSION 4 
  (a)  it x  
strictly 
exogenous 
(b)  it x  
predetermin
ed 
(c)  it x  
endogenou
s 
(a)  it x  
strictly 
exogenous 
(b)  it x  
predetermin
ed 
(c)  it x  
endogenou
s 
(a)  it x  
strictly 
exogenous 
(b)  it x  
predetermin
ed 
(c)  it x  
endogenou
s 
(a)  it x  
strictly 
exogenous 
(b)  it x  
predetermin
ed 
(c)  it x  
endogenou
s 
1 , 1 - t i IGE  
 
0.7531 
(0.1234)*** 
(0.1199)*** 
0.8135 
(0.1230)*** 
(0.1445)*** 
0.6965 
(0.1451)*** 
(0.1525)*** 
0.8993 
(0.1441)*** 
(0.1563)*** 
0.6388 
(0.1232)*** 
(0.1743)*** 
0.4526 
(0.1574)*** 
(0.2283)** 
0.9188 
(0.1469)*** 
(0.1662)*** 
0.6125 
(0.1212)*** 
(0.1717)*** 
0.4405 
(0.1543)*** 
(0.2289)* 
0.9913 
(0.1688)*** 
(0.1864)*** 
0.5709 
(0.1219)*** 
(0.1857)*** 
0.4193 
(0.1539)*** 
(0.2203)* 
it IMN  
 
1 , - t i IMN  
 
0.0139 
(0.0026)*** 
(0.0027)*** 
-0.0057 
(0.0031)* 
(0.0032)* 
0.0063 
(0.0038)* 
(0.0044) 
-0.0014 
(0.0050) 
(0.0042) 
0.0132 
(0.0042)*** 
(0.0050)*** 
-0.0017 
(0.0065) 
(0.0045) 
0.0175 
(0.0032)*** 
(0.0033)*** 
-0.0109 
(0.0045)** 
(0.0048)** 
0.0202 
(0.0055)*** 
(0.0061)*** 
-0.0089 
(0.0068) 
(0.0081) 
0.0239 
(0.0058)*** 
(0.0064)*** 
-0.0108 
(0.0075) 
(0.0085) 
0.0184 
(0.0033)*** 
(0.0035)*** 
-0.0124 
(0.0047)*** 
(0.0054)** 
0.0204 
(0.0055)*** 
(0.0056)*** 
-0.0071 
(0.0068) 
(0.0074) 
0.0241 
(0.0058)*** 
(0.0061)*** 
-0.0103 
(0.0073) 
(0.0081) 
0.0181 
(0.0034)*** 
(0.0036)*** 
-0.0137 
(0.0050)*** 
(0.0061)** 
0.0195 
(0.0051)*** 
(0.0052)*** 
-0.0035 
(0.0066) 
(0.0069) 
0.0231 
(0.0055)*** 
(0.0053)*** 
-0.0108 
(0.0076) 
(0.0067) 
it EMN  
 
1 , - t i EMN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0901 
(0.0518)* 
(0.0493)* 
-0.1282 
(0.0504)** 
(0.0494)*** 
0.1584 
(0.0775)** 
(0.0913)* 
-0.1375 
(0.0503)*** 
(0.0448)*** 
0.2503 
(0.0846)*** 
(0.1029)** 
-0.0850 
(0.0701) 
(0.0687) 
0.1004 
(0.0521)* 
(0.0517)* 
-0.1412 
(0.0513)*** 
(0.0520)*** 
0.1577 
(0.0763)** 
(0.0873)* 
-0.1423 
(0.0498)*** 
(0.0439)*** 
0.2517 
(0.0842)*** 
(0.0995)** 
-0.0895 
(0.0694) 
(0.0694) 
0.0950 
(0.0540)* 
(0.0530)* 
-0.1465 
(0.0531)*** 
(0.0543)*** 
0.1478 
(0.0703)** 
(0.0755)* 
-0.1316 
(0.0492)*** 
(0.0416)*** 
0.2666 
(0.0829)*** 
(0.0843)*** 
-0.0900 
(0.0688) 
(0.0711) 
it EGE1  
 
1 , 1 - t i EGE  
 
   
 
 
 
0.0587 
(0.0346)* 
(0.0256)** 
-0.0720 
(0.0357)** 
(0.0249)*** 
0.1006 
(0.0479)** 
(0.0419)** 
-0.0677 
(0.0370)* 
(0.0264)** 
0.1275 
(0.0572)** 
(0.0551)** 
-0.0342 
(0.0506) 
(0.0465) 
0.0560 
(0.0352) 
(0.0258)** 
-0.0735 
(0.0361)** 
(0.0265)*** 
0.1029 
(0.0478)** 
(0.0433)** 
-0.0658 
(0.0366)* 
(0.0259)** 
0.1293 
(0.0567)** 
(0.0559)** 
-0.0364 
(0.0502) 
(0.0468) 
0.0560 
(0.0363) 
(0.0266)** 
-0.0772 
(0.0374)** 
(0.0280)*** 
0.1124 
(0.0437)** 
(0.0398)*** 
-0.0601 
(0.0350)* 
(0.0240)** 
0.1524 
(0.0550)*** 
(0.0522)*** 
-0.0384 
(0.0483) 
(0.0472) 
it AGE  
 
1 , - t i AGE  
 
   
       
0.0092 
(0.0049)* 
(0.0054)* 
-0.0011 
(0.0033) 
(0.0036) 
0.0082 
(0.0045)* 
(0.0050)* 
-0.0035 
(0.0027) 
(0.0030) 
0.0081 
(0.0044)* 
(0.0051) 
-0.0010 
(0.0028) 
(0.0030) 
0.0100 
(0.0051)* 
(0.0057)* 
-0.0018 
(0.0034) 
(0.0038) 
0.0077 
(0.0044)* 
(0.0052) 
-0.0041 
(0.0028) 
(0.0030) 
0.0073 
(0.0045) 
(0.0051) 
-0.0004 
(0.0030) 
(0.0030) 
it LFSTOCK  
 
1 , - t i LFSTOCK  
 
   
             
0.2505 
(0.1565) 
(0.1739) 
0.0726 
(0.1291) 
(0.1161) 
0.1588 
(0.2936) 
(0.3475) 
-0.1505 
(0.1747) 
(0.1589) 
-0.2972 
(0.3870) 
(0.4391) 
0.2316 
(0.3129) 
(0.3589) 
it ECACRA  
 
1 , - t i ECACRA  
 
   
                   
it UNEM  
 
1 , - t i UNEM  
 
   
                   
it INACTIVE  
 
1 , - t i INACTIVE  
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it ECACRF  
 
1 , - t i ECACRF  
 
     
       
   
     
OBS.  400      392      392      392     
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value) 
12.26 
(0.1989) 
26.20 
(0.0709) 
18.09  
(0.1541)      
10.67 
(0.2988) 
49.79 
(0.0306) 
32.29 
(0.0547) 
9.54 
(0.3888) 
48.36 
(0.0412) 
31.29 
(0.0690) 
9.29 
(0.4107) 
59.13 
(0.0331) 
35.24 
(0.0840) 
AR(1) TEST 
(p-value) 
-5.85 
(0.0000) 
-4.42 
(0.0000) 
-6.11 
(0.0000) 
-4.29 
(0.0000) 
-4.82    
(0.0000) 
-4.09  
(0.0000) 
-5.64 
(0.0000) 
-3.82 
(0.0001) 
-5.39 
(0.0000) 
-3.58 
(0.0003) 
-3.44 
(0.0006) 
-2.32 
(0.0202) 
-5.72 
(0.0000) 
-3.77 
(0.0002) 
-5.35 
(0.0000) 
-3.47 
(0.0005) 
-3.40 
(0.0007) 
-2.24 
(0.0254) 
-5.57 
(0.0000) 
-3.72 
(0.0002) 
-5.33 
(0.0000) 
-3.37 
(0.0008) 
-3.61 
(0.0003) 
-2.51 
(0.0120) 
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value) 
-1.19 
(0.2339) 
-0.68 
(0.4977) 
-1.38 
(0.1671) 
-0.79 
(0.4289) 
-1.14    
(0.2562) 
-0.65 
(0.5188) 
-1.45 
(0.1480) 
-0.85 
(0.3941) 
-1.35 
(0.1783) 
-0.83 
(0.4078) 
-0.89 
(0.3725) 
-0.60 
(0.5470) 
-1.28 
(0.2018) 
-0.74 
(0.4573) 
-1.23 
(0.2193) 
-0.73 
(0.4679) 
-0.78 
(0.4356) 
-0.51 
(0.6100) 
-1.17 
(0.2428) 
-0.68 
(0.4996) 
-1.11 
(0.2680) 
-0.63 
(0.5274) 
-0.96 
(0.3361) 
-0.69 
(0.4912) 
Long-run 
parameters 
                       
IMN  0.0331 
(0.0137)** 
(0.0143)** 
0.0266 
(0.0200) 
(0.0189) 
0.0377 
(0.0136)*** 
(0.0151)** 
0.0654 
(0.0890) 
(0.1038) 
0.0314 
(0.0134)** 
(0.0183)* 
0.0239 
(0.0096)** 
(0.0126)* 
0.0749 
(0.1272) 
(0.1489) 
0.0344 
(0.0128)*** 
(0.0180)* 
0.0248 
(0.0093)*** 
(0.0121)** 
0.5001 
(9.4502) 
(10.4434) 
0.0372 
(0.0121)*** 
(0.0163)** 
0.0211 
(0.0102)** 
(0.0108)* 
EMN 
     
-0.3781 
(0.9759) 
(1.1395) 
0.0577 
(0.1948) 
(0.2269) 
0.3018 
(0.1555)* 
(0.1692)* 
-0.5019 
(1.4055) 
(1.6554) 
0.0399 
(0.1813) 
(0.2137) 
0.2899 
(0.1518)* 
(0.1641)* 
-5.8878 
(116.8038) 
(129.5313) 
0.0378 
(0.1533) 
(0.1723) 
0.3042 
(0.1474)** 
(0.1593)* 
EGE1 
     
-0.1317 
(0.5449) 
(0.5273) 
0.0912 
(0.1180) 
(0.0819) 
0.1705 
(0.1015)* 
(0.0861)** 
-0.2153 
(0.8028) 
(0.8323) 
0.0957 
(0.1102) 
(0.0831) 
0.1660 
(0.0997)* 
(0.0874)* 
-2.4249 
(49.2962) 
(54.5765) 
0.1218 
(0.0920) 
(0.0742) 
0.1963 
(0.0944)** 
(0.0934)** 
AGE 
           
0.1000 
(0.2066) 
(0.2464) 
0.0121 
(0.0144) 
(0.0169) 
0.0127 
(0.0105) 
(0.0138) 
0.9354 
(18.2349) 
(20.2553) 
0.0085 
(0.0126) 
(0.0150) 
0.0119 
(0.0101) 
(0.0126) 
LFSTOCK 
                 
36.9702 
(726.0782) 
(800.2190) 
0.0195 
(0.6375) 
(0.7831) 
-0.1129 
(0.7628) 
(0.8953) 
ECACRA                         
UNEM                         
INACTIVE                         
ECACRF                         
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  REGRESSION 5  REGRESSION 6  REGRESSION 7     
  (a)  it x  
strictly 
exogenous 
(b)  it x  
predetermin
ed 
(c)  it x  
endogenou
s 
(a)  it x  
strictly 
exogenous 
(b)  it x  
predetermin
ed 
(c)  it x  
endogenou
s 
(a)  it x  
strictly 
exogenous 
(b)  it x  
predetermin
ed 
(c)  it x  
endogenou
s 
     
1 , 1 - t i IGE  
 
0.6263 
(0.1278)*** 
(0.1423)*** 
0.4689 
(0.1113)*** 
(0.1382)*** 
0.5554 
(0.1392)*** 
(0.1788)*** 
0.7371 
(0.1434)*** 
(0.1626)*** 
0.3899 
(0.0977)*** 
(0.1225)*** 
0.4300 
(0.1255)*** 
(0.1537)*** 
0.7274 
(0.1365)*** 
(0.1499)*** 
0.5741 
(0.1072)*** 
(0.1369)*** 
0.4963 
(0.1341)*** 
(0.1656)***       
it IMN  
 
1 , - t i IMN  
 
0.0163 
(0.0040)*** 
(0.0047)*** 
-0.0106 
(0.0045)** 
(0.0056)* 
0.0054 
(0.0062) 
(0.0074) 
0.0016 
(0.0062) 
(0.0081) 
0.0075 
(0.0077) 
(0.0096) 
-0.0037 
(0.0076) 
(0.0108) 
0.0168 
(0.0043)*** 
(0.0049)*** 
-0.0130 
(0.0048)*** 
(0.0060)** 
0.0127 
(0.0056)** 
(0.0060)** 
-0.0042 
(0.0054) 
(0.0059) 
0.0138 
(0.0071)* 
(0.0076)* 
-0.0083 
(0.0070) 
(0.0080) 
0.0157 
(0.0042)*** 
(0.0048)*** 
-0.0128 
(0.0047)*** 
(0.0055)** 
0.0095 
(0.0058) 
(0.0063) 
-0.0021 
(0.0055) 
(0.0062) 
0.0109 
(0.0071) 
(0.0081) 
-0.0050 
(0.0069) 
(0.0076)       
it EMN  
 
1 , - t i EMN  
0.0780 
(0.0520) 
(0.0563) 
-0.1182 
(0.0473)** 
(0.0534)** 
0.0277 
(0.0751) 
(0.0979) 
-0.0978 
(0.0513)* 
(0.0503)* 
0.0391 
(0.0899) 
(0.1158) 
-0.1689 
(0.0679)** 
(0.0810)** 
0.0851 
(0.0548) 
(0.0541) 
-0.1214 
(0.0504)** 
(0.0560)** 
0.0866 
(0.0654) 
(0.0697) 
-0.1057 
(0.0486)** 
(0.0474)** 
0.1129 
(0.0841) 
(0.0960) 
-0.1273 
(0.0628)** 
(0.0676)* 
0.0865 
(0.0539) 
(0.0533) 
-0.1267 
(0.0498)** 
(0.0588)** 
0.0312 
(0.0669) 
(0.0618) 
-0.0900 
(0.0506)* 
(0.0508)* 
-0.0036 
(0.0846) 
(0.0849) 
-0.1188 
(0.0635)* 
(0.0739)       
it EGE1  
 
1 , 1 - t i EGE  
 
0.0456 
(0.0318) 
(0.0269)* 
-0.0655 
(0.0317)** 
(0.0263)** 
0.0765 
(0.0448)* 
(0.0527) 
-0.0659 
(0.0351)* 
(0.0282)** 
0.0504 
(0.0618) 
(0.0590) 
-0.1297 
(0.0537)** 
(0.0520)** 
0.0511 
(0.0337) 
(0.0287)* 
-0.0664 
(0.0336)** 
(0.0282)** 
0.0702 
(0.0404)* 
(0.0406)* 
-0.0429 
(0.0319) 
(0.0205)** 
0.0439 
(0.0559) 
(0.0526) 
-0.0587 
(0.0464) 
(0.0388) 
0.0525 
(0.0331) 
(0.0272)* 
-0.0715 
(0.0332)** 
(0.0300)** 
0.0524 
(0.0424) 
(0.0369) 
-0.0511 
(0.0342) 
(0.0252)** 
0.0016 
(0.0578) 
(0.0601) 
-0.0592 
(0.0470) 
(0.0480)       
it AGE  
 
1 , - t i AGE  
 
0.0080 
(0.0049)* 
(0.0057) 
-0.0011 
(0.0030) 
(0.0036) 
0.0013 
(0.0050) 
(0.0061) 
-0.0070 
(0.0027)** 
(0.0032)** 
0.0027 
(0.0055) 
(0.0070) 
-0.0033 
(0.0031) 
(0.0035) 
0.0083 
(0.0051) 
(0.0055) 
-0.0021 
(0.0032) 
(0.0036) 
0.0050 
(0.0046) 
(0.0053) 
-0.0059 
(0.0026)** 
(0.0031)* 
0.0088 
(0.0054) 
(0.0068) 
-0.0005 
(0.0031) 
(0.0035) 
0.0108 
(0.0053)** 
(0.0056)* 
-0.0022 
(0.0032) 
(0.0037) 
0.0080 
(0.0055) 
(0.0062) 
-0.0071 
(0.0029)** 
(0.0035)** 
0.0113 
(0.0063)* 
(0.0075) 
-0.0030 
(0.0032) 
(0.0035)       
it LFSTOCK  
 
1 , - t i LFSTOCK  
                         
it ECACRA  
 
1 , - t i ECACRA  
 
-0.0078 
(0.0022)*** 
(0.0021)*** 
-0.0046 
(0.0023)** 
(0.0021)** 
-0.0051 
(0.0035) 
(0.0036) 
-0.0067 
(0.0032)** 
(0.0032)** 
-0.0072 
(0.0042)* 
(0.0039)* 
-0.0082 
(0.0046)* 
(0.0050)               
   
it UNEM  
 
1 , - t i UNEM  
       
-0.0865 
(0.2213) 
(0.1836) 
-0.3702 
(0.2206)* 
(0.2556) 
0.1723 
(0.3225) 
(0.3195) 
0.2074 
(0.2431) 
(0.2703) 
0.2386 
(0.3890) 
(0.3674) 
0.8445 
(0.3645)** 
(0.2979)***         
   
it INACTIVE  
 
1 , - t i INACTIVE  
           
-0.4672 
(0.1766)*** 
(0.2104)** 
0.0567 
(0.1394) 
(0.1236) 
-0.6287 
(0.3249)* 
(0.3580)* 
0.2356 
(0.1733) 
(0.1577) 
-0.8120 
(0.4393)* 
(0.5851) 
-0.3325 
(0.3420) 
(0.3591)   
     48 
it ECACRF  
 
1 , - t i ECACRF  
     
  -0.0048 
(0.0020)** 
(0.0020)** 
-0.0056 
(0.0021)*** 
(0.0020)*** 
-0.0043 
(0.0026) 
(0.0025)* 
-0.0059 
(0.0026)** 
(0.0030)** 
-0.0066 
(0.0034)** 
(0.0032)** 
-0.0033 
(0.0040) 
(0.0043) 
-0.0053 
(0.0019)*** 
(0.0021)** 
-0.0052 
(0.0020)** 
(0.0019)*** 
-0.0062 
(0.0033)* 
(0.0029)** 
-0.0036 
(0.0028) 
(0.0030) 
-0.0132 
(0.0047)*** 
(0.0051)** 
-0.0062 
(0.0041) 
(0.0044)   
   
OBS.  325      325      325           
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value) 
9.12 
(0.4264) 
58.44 
(0.0378) 
27.06 
(0.3527) 
8.71 
(0.4644) 
86.75 
(0.0007) 
36.89 
(0.1491) 
7.32 
(0.6041) 
64.35 
(0.0696) 
32.70 
(0.2899)       
AR(1) TEST 
(p-value) 
-4.93 
(0.0000) 
-3.51 
(0.0005) 
-4.79 
(0.0000) 
-3.36 
(0.0008) 
-4.09 
(0.0000) 
-2.92 
(0.0035) 
-5.03 
(0.0000) 
-3.56 
(0.0004) 
-4.93 
(0.0000) 
-3.22 
(0.0013) 
-4.02 
(0.0001) 
-3.01 
(0.0026) 
-5.20 
(0.0000) 
-3.79 
(0.0002) 
-5.28 
(0.0000) 
-3.44 
(0.0006) 
-2.99 
(0.0028) 
-2.31 
(0.0210)       
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value) 
-0.87 
(0.3866) 
-0.50 
(0.6168) 
-1.46 
(0.1441) 
-0.77 
(0.4422) 
-1.36 
(0.1723) 
-0.76 
(0.4443) 
-0.67 
(0.5056) 
-0.40 
(0.6876) 
-1.66 
(0.0960) 
-0.92 
(0.3583) 
-1.82 
(0.0692) 
-1.15 
(0.2493) 
-0.65 
(0.5181) 
-0.39 
(0.6996) 
-0.75 
(0.4558) 
-0.43 
(0.6705) 
-1.36 
(0.1752) 
-0.95 
(0.3415)       
Long-run 
parameters 
                       
IMN  0.0151 
(0.0124) 
(0.0133) 
0.0133 
(0.0101) 
(0.0099) 
0.0086 
(0.0135) 
(0.0157) 
0.0144 
(0.0187) 
(0.0200) 
0.0140 
(0.0080)* 
(0.0070)** 
0.0097 
(0.0103) 
(0.0103) 
0.0104 
(0.0179) 
(0.0201) 
0.0173 
(0.0126) 
(0.0131) 
0.0118 
(0.0115) 
(0.0124)       
EMN  -0.1077 
(0.1761) 
(0.2117) 
-0.1321 
(0.1340) 
(0.1844) 
-0.2919 
(0.2186) 
(0.2773) 
-0.1380 
(0.2748) 
(0.3289) 
-0.0312 
(0.1025) 
(0.1304) 
-0.0252 
(0.1437) 
(0.1815) 
-0.1475 
(0.2644) 
(0.3172) 
-0.1382 
(0.1610) 
(0.1864) 
-0.2431 
(0.1802) 
(0.2386)       
EGE1  -0.0531 
(0.1159) 
(0.1206) 
0.0199 
(0.0831) 
(0.0964) 
-0.1783 
(0.1534) 
(0.1612) 
-0.0581 
(0.1769) 
(0.1908) 
0.0447 
(0.0649) 
(0.0750) 
-0.0261 
(0.1000) 
(0.1073) 
-0.0698 
(0.1718) 
(0.1833) 
0.0031 
(0.0997) 
(0.1060) 
-0.1144 
(0.1225) 
(0.1661)       
AGE  0.0186 
(0.0182) 
(0.0238) 
-0.0107 
(0.0108) 
(0.0132) 
-0.0014 
(0.0150) 
(0.0200) 
0.0239 
(0.0287) 
(0.0349) 
-0.0014 
(0.0089) 
(0.0102) 
0.0147 
(0.0121) 
(0.0160) 
0.0313 
(0.0308) 
(0.0355) 
0.0021 
(0.0148) 
(0.0176) 
0.0165 
(0.0151) 
(0.0192)       
LFSTOCK                         
ECACRA  -0.0332 
(0.0119)*** 
(0.0145)** 
-0.0223 
(0.0071)*** 
(0.0085)*** 
-0.0345 
(0.0108)*** 
(0.0123)***                   
UNEM 
     
-1.7372 
(1.8359) 
(2.1020) 
0.6224 
(0.6127) 
(0.7629) 
1.9000 
(0.9162)** 
(0.8548)** 
 
 
           
INACTIVE 
           
-1.5061 
(1.2721) 
(1.4377) 
-0.9230 
(0.9194) 
(1.0003) 
-2.2723 
(1.2988)* 
(1.7279)       
ECACRF 
     
-0.0396 
(0.0226)* 
(0.0285) 
-0.0168 
(0.0052)*** 
(0.0062)*** 
-0.0175 
(0.0074)** 
(0.0072)** 
-0.0383 
(0.0200)* 
(0.0247) 
-0.0230 
(0.0088)*** 
(0.0101)** 
-0.0384 
(0.0111)*** 
(0.0137)***       
NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  (*), (**), and (***) denotes the significance of the White (1980) estimator (robust 
standard errors) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. SARGAN TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan, 1958). AR(1) TEST and AR(2) TEST are the 
Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a constant are included.  
 
 
 